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Abstract—This paper introduces a blind watermarking based
on a convolutional neural network (CNN). We propose an itera-
tive learning framework to secure robustness of watermarking.
One loop of learning process consists of the following three stages:
Watermark embedding, attack simulation, and weight update.
We have learned a network that can detect a 1-bit message from
a image sub-block. Experimental results show that this learned
network is an extension of the frequency domain that is widely
used in existing watermarking scheme. The proposed scheme
achieved robustness against geometric and signal processing
attacks with a learning time of one day.
Index Terms—digital watermarking, color image watermark-
ing, blind watermarking, convolutional neural network(CNN).
I. INTRODUCTION
WATERMARKING is used to identify and protect own-ership of copyrighted media content, by embedding
invisible data into the original content. The most difficult
requirements for watermarking schemes is robustness; the
detector should be able to extract the watermark properly even
if the content has little distortion. The second requirement is
invisibility; the visual quality should not be damaged too much
by the mark.
Over the last decade, most watermarking techniques have
acquired robustness using the frequency domain. Generally,
the first step is to use a transform such as DCT or DWT
to create a set of values corresponding to the original pixel
data. Then some of the values in the transformed domain
are modified and become the pixel data by inverse transform
[1], [2]. In recent years, quaternion discrete Fourier transform
(QDFT) performs best for blind watermarking techniques
for color images as shown in [3]–[5]. These techniques are
robust against signal processing attacks by applying QDFT
for small image blocks. For geometric attacks, the robustness
was secured with the help of a template. However, since their
templates are limited to compensating for RST attacks, they
are vulnerable to general affine transformation.
In this paper, we optimize robustness while considering
invisibility in depth. Our goal is to learn convolutional neural
network (CNN) beyond QDFT and replace it. In fact, water-
mark detection using QDFT is representable by a very shallow
network. According to [4], each component of QDFT can
be obtained as a linear combination of DFT coefficients on
each color channel. Most of recent techniques use quantization
index modulation (QIM) [3]–[5], which can be represented
by one ReLU and two fully connected layer back and forth.
Here, adjacent linear layers can be replaced by one linear layer.
Taken together, QDFT and QIM is like combining three layers
in a linear, ReLU, and linear order as shown in Figure 1.
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Fig. 1. A network representation of an existing watermarking domain. The
same logic holds for a linear transform such as DFT or DCT as well as QDFT.
Where 4 is the quantization step of QIM.
Therefore, CNN with a sufficiently large number of layers and
filters can be seen as a generalization of QDFT and QIM. The
proposed CNN model has 12 ReLU layers alternating with
linear layers. In addition, the proposed model parameters are
optimized for learning while QDFT is fixed. Unlike QDFT, the
proposed scheme has domain specialized to watermarking.
As shown in Figure 2, we propose a light-weight and simple
framework using a CNN. And this iterative process obtains
a robust domain based on the given attack such as JPEG,
resizing and noise addition. As a result, when new attacks are
given, our framework can adaptively re-acquire robustness.
Signal processing attacks and geometric attacks were tested
experimentally. The comparison with the QDFT-based water-
marking paper [5] are shown. Experimental results show that
the learning-based domain can surpass the existing frequency
domain used for watermarking.
II. PROPOSED CNN BASED WATERMARKING
A. Main idea of learning framework
The goal of this iterative process is to construct a CNN
model that takes an R×C size block as input and determines a
message bit. This CNN is then used in a similar way to QDFT
in traditional frequency domain watermarking techniques [3].
Training comprises three stages starting from a CNN with
random weights. This three stages are repeated until the
watermark that CNN embedded is correctly identified after the
attack. In this subsection we provides details for each stage.
1) Watermark embedding using CNN: The first stage is
the process of inserting a watermark into the image using
the CNN of the previous loop. This stage accepts images
and watermarks of M × N size and generates watermarked
images. First, images and the corresponding watermarks are
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Fig. 2. Framework of learning CNN for watermarking. The embedded mark
is shown as visible for better understanding. At the top right corner is a
simplified illustration
divided into non-overlapping blocks of R × C size. The
message bit m of each block B is determined by looking
at the watermark image of the corresponding block position.
We want to incrementally change the image so that CNN
recognizes block B as m. We update the image by taking the
gradient decent method (SGD), which is designed to update
the weights:
B(t+1) = B(t) − α∇BL(W,B(t),m) (1)
L(W,B,m) = −log p(m|W,B) + 1
2
λ‖B−B0‖22 (2)
where B(t) is the block to embedding at iteration t, α is
the embedding rate, W is the weights of the CNN, L is
the loss function and includes a cross-entropy loss term as
in Equation 4. The loss function was devised to protect the
invisibility while embedding the watermark. p(m|W,B) is
the probability that message m is inserted into B predicted
by CNN. We introduced the l2 regularization term ‖ • ‖2 to
ensure invisibility.
Empirically, we have confirmed that if α is sufficiently
small, the loss gradually decreases as shown in Figure 3 even
in the case of random weights. A loss close to 0 means that
the message m is properly inserted into block B. The blocks
are then combined to produce a watermarked image. Note that
the weight W does not change in this stage.
2) Attack simulation: Attack simulation is necessary for
CNN to adaptively capture invariant features for various at-
tacks. This stage accepts the watermarked image to produce
the attacked image. The important thing is that not only the
watermarked cover image but also the watermark images are
attacked. This attacked watermark is used as a true label for
supervised learning in the next stage. The simulated attack
sets include affine transform, cropping, JPEG compression,
noising, Gaussian filtering, median filtering, rotation, rescal-
ing. For each image and watermark, a pair of attacked images
is created as many times as the number of attacks.
3) CNN weight update: Now we update the CNN weights
so we can correctly extract the watermark from the given
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Fig. 3. Changes in Cross-entropy loss and invisibility according to the
embedding step. The points are determined by the average of the 128 blocks.
A description of the PSNR is given in Section III.
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Fig. 4. Cross-entropy loss in the updating stage. The vertical lines divide
each update stage and indicate that it has passed the embedding and attack
stages.
image. That is, CNN itself has to imitate the role of the
detector. This stage begins by setting the size of all the attacked
image to M × N . As before, divide the image into non-
overlapping blocks of R × C size. Again, The message bit
m′ of each distorted block B′ is determined by looking at the
watermark image of the corresponding block position. If the
average value of the watermark image block is grater than 0.5,
we set the message bit m′ as 1 and set as 0 otherwise. We
applied the gradient descent method so that when CNN takes
B′ as an input, it correctly predicts m′.
W(t+1) =W(t) − η∇WL(W(t),B′,m′), (3)
where W(t) is the weights at iteration t, η is the learning rate.
The loss function, L, is identical to that of the embedding
stage. At the end of this stage, all watermarked and attacked
images created so far are deleted and the process returns to
the embedding stage.
The lower the loss, the more CNN can correctly extract
message bits regardless of attack. In other words, robustness
against various attack is secured. We measured the loss every
time the stage was repeated. Figure 4 shows empirical reduc-
tion of the loss by the proposed framework.
B. Use of trained CNN
If CNN’s weights parameters converged sufficiently due
to the learning framework, this subsection describes how
CNN can be used for embedder and detector of applicable
watermarking. The roles and functions of the embedder are
described in detail in the previous subsection. The embedding
3process for learning and the actual application are exactly
the same. However, the CNN used in this case has a weight
obtained at the end of learning. The CNN as a detector extracts
a 1-bit message for each R × C block as before. The CNN
predicts the message from the block of the attacked image. If
the probability of 0 as a result of the softmax layer is larger
than 0.5, the message of the block is decided to 0. Otherwise,
the message bit is decided to 1. As a result, a watermark of
(M/R)× (N/C) size is extracted for one image.
C. Implementation details
We propose a CNN model modified from a part of the most
powerful model called Residual Network [6], which includes
residual units and batch normalization. The proposed CNN
contains 14 convolution layers and the kernel size of each
convolution layer is 1×1 or 3×3. The number of filters in
each convolution layer was 128. A soft-max layer is added at
the end for classification. Generally, the more layers, the better
the detection performance, but there is a trade-off where the
feed-forwarding and the back-propagation time increase. The
number of layers and filters was determined experimentally.
Dropout was not used because it can be replaced by batch
normalization. Pooling is aimed at ensuring spatial invariance,
but it causes performance degradation to capture fine patterns.
So we did not use max-pooling or average-pooling.
The image data used for training consisted of 4000 24-bit
colour images from the BOSSBase dataset designed for data
hiding studies [7]. Without loss of generality, we set M =
N = 512 and R = C = 8. Initially, α and η were set to 0.01
and 0.001 respectively. We used 8 randomly sampled images
per embedded stage and 15 types of attacks are used. For one
image, we used a pair of watermarks, 0 and 1 being inverted
from each other. Each image is divided into 4096 blocks so
8× 2× 15× 4096 blocks are used in one updating stage. The
update unit, batch, consists of 128 blocks and is sampled from
the attacked images.
In practice, we used adaptive moment estimation (Adam)
instead of SGD because Adam is more complicated but has
better loss reduction. Also, the gradient in Equation 1 is
normalized with mean and standard deviation for invisibility
and fast convergence. Inspired by learning rate annealing, we
reduced the α by 0.9 times per iteration. Iteration t for each
blocks in the embedding phase is limited to 12.
III. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The network was trained using a GPU, NVIDIA GTX 1070
for one day, and test images and test watermarks were not
used for the training. Attack experiments were performed
using StirMark benchmark [8] for JPEG, noising and affine
transforms. For the remaining attacks, Python libraries scikit-
image [9] and scipy [10] were used.
We conducted robustness testing for signal processing at-
tacks and geometric attacks. The comparison technique is
QDFT based watermarking. One bit is inserted into the
QDFT mid-frequency coefficients of four components by QIM
method. Existing techniques [3], [5] estimate the rotation
angle, the moving distance, and the scaling factor at the
Fig. 5. Visual impact comparison before and after watermark embedding. The
top row is the original test images and the bottom row is the watermarked
test images.
detection step using the inserted template. We assumed that
the RST correction through this estimation was performed
without error to compare performance with existing QDFT,
as [4] did. Table I shows the result of registering an attacked
image first, and we implemented the comparison technique.
To make the embedding capacity the same as the proposed
technique, the comparison technique inserts one bit in one
block as [5] does. For robustness comparison, both techniques
omitted the scrambling of the watermark.
Like the related works [3]–[5], [11], standard test images
Baboon, Lenna and Peppers were used as cover images. They
are all 24 bit color images and are 512×512 in size as shown
in Figure 5. MPEG-7 CE Shape-1 [12], a binary image data
set, was processed for use as a watermark image.
The standard deviation of the kernel used in Gaussian
filtering is 1. Median filtering was performed for each channel
with a 3×3 kernel. We experimented with six types of affine
transformations that move the pixel coordinates a bit as in
Stirmark benchmark [8]:[
x′
y′
]
=Mi
[
x
y
]
(4)
M1 =
[
1 0
0.01 1
]
, M2 =
[
1 0.01
0 1
]
,
M3 =
[
1 0.01
0.01 1
]
, M4 =
[
1.01 0.013
0.009 1.011
]
,
M5 =
[
1.007 0.01
0.01 1.012
]
, M6 =
[
1.013 0.008
0.011 1.008
]
where Mi is a matrix corresponding to transformation number
i. x and y are the pixel coordinates before the transformation,
and x′ and y′ are the coordinates after the transformation.
Robustness and invisibility performance were measured by
normalized correlation (NC) and peak signal-to-noise ratio
(PSNR), respectively.
PSNR(I, I′) = 10 log10{
2552 × 3MN
‖I− I′‖22
} (5)
NC(w,w′) =
〈w,w′〉
‖w‖2‖w′‖2 (6)
4TABLE I
COMPARISON OF THE EXTRACTED WATERMARKS WITH REGISTRATION
Attacks
QDFT [5] Training A1 Training A1-A8 Training A1-A16
Baboon Lenna Peppers Baboon Lenna Peppers Baboon Lenna Peppers Baboon Lenna Peppers
A1 No attack (PSNR) 35.7dB 37.2dB 37.4dB 38.9dB 38.9dB 39.0dB 35.1dB 38.3dB 38.8dB 35.9dB 39.2dB 38.9dB
A2 JPEG 80 0.5008 0.7673 0.8313 -0.0372 0.1326 0.2127 0.5305 0.5826 0.6578 0.6384 0.8963 0.8938
A3 JPEG 90 0.6880 0.8143 0.8850 -0.0252 0.1886 0.2253 0.7684 0.8571 0.9251 0.9129 0.9676 0.9614
A4 Median filtering 0.6596 0.9460 0.9760 0.1951 0.3221 0.3322 0.7189 0.8461 0.8751 0.8377 0.8987 0.8985
A5 Gaussian filtering 0.4746 0.7933 0.8947 0.4374 0.4631 0.6218 0.9076 0.9238 0.9454 0.9625 0.9343 0.9590
A6 Affine 1 0.3062 0.3148 0.3229 0.1955 0.2459 0.3128 0.9673 0.9831 0.9910 0.8971 0.9738 0.9451
A7 Affine 2 0.3036 0.3143 0.3201 0.2281 0.2330 0.2482 0.9857 0.9858 0.9933 0.8428 0.9417 0.9236
A8 Affine 3 0.1402 0.0477 0.0185 0.1016 0.3122 0.4088 0.8381 0.8918 0.9005 0.9532 0.9032 0.9090
A9 Affine 4 0.1212 0.0803 -0.0105 0.1019 0.3083 0.3735 0.7197 0.7952 0.8446 0.9207 0.8343 0.8794
A10 Affine 5 0.1324 0.0899 -0.0217 0.0239 0.2248 0.3587 0.8093 0.8654 0.8822 0.9450 0.9055 0.9125
A11 Affine 6 0.1494 0.0753 0.0057 -0.0257 0.1149 0.2585 0.7785 0.7996 0.8744 0.9337 0.8631 0.8661
A12 Noising 0.9220 0.8880 0.9077 0.9704 0.9863 0.9962 0.6594 0.7167 0.9076 0.9737 0.8784 0.9084
A13 Resizing 75% 0.8425 0.9539 0.9780 0.7081 0.8002 0.8360 0.9903 0.9934 0.9970 0.9891 0.9947 0.9961
A14 Rotation 10◦ 0.6721 0.8733 0.9252 0.5918 0.6425 0.7367 0.9857 0.9934 0.9970 0.9749 0.9781 0.9817
A15 Rotation 90◦ 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9967 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
A16 Cropping 80% 0.8362 0.9910 0.9745 0.8740 0.9868 0.9910 0.8746 0.9921 1.0000 0.8730 1.0000 0.9921
where I and I′ denote the original cover image and the cover
image after embedding, respectively. w and w′ denote the
bit sequences of the original watermark and the watermark
detected after the attack, respectively. 〈·, ·〉 means the inner
product. NC and PSNR are the most widely used performance
indicators as shown in previous watermarking papers [2], [5],
[11].
Table I shows the test results according to the attack set
to be trained. Two observations are derived from the third
column. First, the attacks that are included in the training
set show higher robustness than those that are not. Second,
The robustness of the third column tends to be lower than
the robustness of the rightmost column. We infer the cause
of this anomaly as certain attacks will help to find robust
features for other attacks when added to training. Based on two
observations, it is obvious that we have to train enough of the
various sets of attacks. In this paper, therefore, the rightmost
column is proposed.
IV. DISCUSSION AND RELATED WORK
The proposed scheme assume that it is used with existing
template matching methods. So we can not get robust corre-
lation results against rotation and cropping without assuming
registration. The extracted watermarks in the absence of regis-
tration are as shown in table II. The computational complexity
of proposed method is higher than that of QIM after QDFT
and the time required for detection is longer. Experimentally,
the proposed technique took about 1.6s to detect watermark
from one image and the comparison technique took 0.5s using
a CPU i7-4770k.
The first CNN-based watermarking technique is proposed
by [11]. Unlike the proposed technique, [11] uses CNN as
an auto-encoder to present a new domain. However, [11]
is a non-blind method. Therefore, although the robustness
TABLE II
COMPARISON OF THE EXTRACTED WATERMARKS WITHOUT
REGISTRATION
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image after embedding, respectively. w and w′ denote the
bit sequences of the original watermark and the watermark
detected after the attack, respectively. 〈·, ·〉 means the inner
product. NC and PSNR are the most widely used performance
indicators as shown in previous watermarking papers [2], [5],
[11].
Table I shows the test results according to the attack set
to be trained. Two observations are derived from the third
colum . First, the attacks that are included in the training
set show higher robustness than those that are not. Second,
The robustness of the third column tends to be lower than
the robustness of the rightmost column. We infer the cause
of this anomaly as certain attacks will help to find robust
features for other attacks when added to training. Based on two
observations, it is obvious that we have to train enough of the
various sets of attacks. In this paper, therefore, the rightmost
column is proposed.
IV. DISCUSSION AND RELATED WORK
The proposed scheme assume that it is used with existing
template matching methods. So we can not get robust corre-
lation results against rotation and cropping without assuming
registration. The extracted watermarks in the absence of regis-
tration are as shown in table II. The computational complexity
of proposed method is higher than that of QIM after QDFT
and the time required for detection is longer. Experimentally,
the propo ed tech ique took about 1.6s to detect watermark
from one image and t comparison technique took 0.5s
using a CPU i7-4770k. The first CNN-based watermarking
technique is propos d by [11]. Unlike the proposed technique,
[11] uses CNN as an auto-enc der to pres nt a new domain.
However, [11] is a non-blind method. Therefore, although the
robustness of these techniques is high, they are less useful in
real scenarios. The proposed technique, on the other hand, is
a blind watermarking.
TABLE II
COMPARISON OF THE EXTRACTED WATERMARKS WITHOUT
REGISTRATION
Attacks QDFT [5] ProposedBaboon Lenna Peppers Baboon Lenna Peppers
Rotation
90◦
(NC) 0.0104 -0.0190 0.0062 0.1129 0.4309 0.2496
Rotation
10◦
(NC) 0.1059 0.1193 0.1109 0.4352 0.4710 0.5505
Cropping
80%
(NC) 0.0198 0.0258 0.0638 0.5062 0.5363 0.5381
V. CONCLUSION
We proposed a robust blind watermarking technique using
CNN. Experiments have yielded higher PSNR and NC values
than comparative methods for test images. The learned models
outperformed QDFT with assuming registration. Traditional
watermarking researches first design the transform, and then
attack and measure performance. In contrast, the proposed
scheme optimized the watermarking domain through attack
functions. Above all, the scheme does not require detailed
algorithms of each attack or expert knowledge to counter them.
Our technique was adaptive to the attacks and required only
one day of learning time. We are continuing our research
to increase the embedding and detection speed while at the
same time allowing the proposed method to have a template
matching method.
of these techniques is high, they are less useful in real
scenarios. The proposed technique, on the other hand, is a
blind watermarking.
V. CONCLUSION
W proposed a robust blind watermarking technique using
CNN. Experiments have yielded higher PSNR and NC values
than comparative methods for test images. The learned models
outperformed QDFT with assuming regis ration. Traditional
watermarking rese rches first design th transform, and then
attack and measure performance. In contrast, the proposed
scheme optimized the watermarking domain through attack
functions. Above all, the scheme does not require detailed
algorithms of each attack or expert knowledge to counter them.
Our technique was adaptive to the attacks and required only
one day of learning time.
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